

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

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**FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND ELEVENTH MEETING**

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Wednesday, 20 March 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Arthur S. LALL (India)

63-10411

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.A. de MELO FRANCO  
Mr. J. MACHADO LOPES  
Mr. J. FRANK da COSTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV  
Mr. G. GUELEV  
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV  
Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON  
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. S.F. RAE  
Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB  
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA  
Mr. A. MIKULIN  
Mr. V. VAJNAR  
Mr. V. PECHOTA

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU  
Ato M. HAMID  
Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL  
Mr. A.S. MEHTA  
Mr. S.B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI  
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI  
Mr. P. TOZZOLI

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. MBU

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Mr. O. NEDA

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

Baron C.H. von PLATEN

Mr. E. CORNELL

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN

Mr. I.G. USACHEV

Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. S. AHMED

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON  
Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN  
Mr. J.M. EDES  
Mr. J.H. LAMBERT

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE  
Mr. A.L. RICHARDS  
Mr. D.E. MARK  
Mr. V. BAKER

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. M.A. VELLODI

The CHAIRMAN (India): I declare open the one hundred and eleventh plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): Recent meetings of the Committee have, as you know, been largely devoted to procedural matters; but we have not yet succeeded in reaching complete agreement on the questions to be included in the agenda, nor have we been able to establish the order in which these questions should be discussed by the Committee of the Whole.

Like most of the other delegations, our delegation would certainly have preferred to concentrate upon the problem of nuclear tests until a solution had been reached. The intransigence of the Western delegations and their obstinate refusal to accept the compromise solution proposed by the Soviet Union have created a deadlock on this point. As will be recalled, however, this compromise solution was put forward by the Soviet Union bearing in mind precisely the positions adopted by the Western delegations and the suggestions made by them.

That we now find it necessary to discuss procedure without being able to solve the problem of the cessation of nuclear tests is because the Western Powers have not entertained the Soviet compromise solution, because they have not, in the words of the United Arab Republic representative, made it the object of real appreciation and matched it by a similar spirit (ENDC/PV.99, p.11). We believe that if the Western delegations, and more particularly the United States, were to adopt a spirit of compromise similar to that of the Soviet delegation, an agreement could soon be reached on a nuclear test ban.

The insistence of the Western delegations on plunging the Conference into a discussion of the details of certain particular questions concerning the control of a nuclear test ban does not give evidence of the least desire on their part to facilitate an agreement on such a ban. On the contrary, it is a significant indication that the Western delegations, and particularly the United States delegation, wish to drag out the proceedings in order to prevent the Conference from reaching agreement on this question.

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In these circumstances it became necessary for the Committee, without losing sight of the nuclear test ban problem -- a very important question the solution of which would have made possible an effective approach to other questions of disarmament -- to turn its attention to other tasks assigned to it by the United Nations General Assembly, and first and foremost to the question of general and complete disarmament.

The delegation of the Bulgarian People's Republic is happy to note that the co-Chairmen have been able to agree to the continuance of the examination of the question of general and complete disarmament, and in particular of those measures belonging to the first stage of the future treaty concerning nuclear weapons delivery vehicles. (ENDC/52, para. 5b). The members of the Conference will thus have an opportunity of appreciating what a favourable influence on the solution of the disarmament problem can be exercised by the latest Soviet proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1, art. 5) concerning the possibility of retaining a strictly-limited number of certain types of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles until the end of the second stage in the territory of the Soviet Union and the United States of America exclusively. This proposal was made on 20 September in the General Assembly by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko (A/PV.1127, p.38-40).

We regret, however, that there has been no agreement on the agenda for the Committee of the Whole. Many collateral problems have been proposed the solution of which could create more favourable conditions and a better atmosphere for solving all the problems of disarmament and attaining the principal object of the Conference: the elaboration of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. In accordance with the terms of General Assembly resolution 1767 (XVII), these questions should be urgently examined in order to diminish tension between States, to create an atmosphere of confidence, and to facilitate general and complete disarmament.

We must note with regret, however, that the United States co-Chairman and the Western delegations are obstinately opposing the examination of these collateral problems, the solution of which, as all delegations recognize, could create favourable conditions for the further work of our Conference. This makes it even more difficult

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to understand why the United States delegation opposes the discussion of the question proposed by the Soviet Union: the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States members of NATO (ENDC/77).

We are entirely in agreement with the opinion expressed by the Italian representative, Mr. Cavalletti, when he said.

"The hopes of the world would be disappointed if the Committee of the Whole were to plunge into long and futile discussions on subjects concerning which, as we already know, agreement is extremely difficult to obtain.

"Therefore to my mind we should first of all choose relatively easy and concrete measures which present a good and encouraging prospect for agreement." (ENDC/PV.110, p.41)

After such statements one can only wonder why the Western delegations are opposing the inclusion of the question of concluding a non-aggression pact in the Conference agenda. Are there any measures which would be easier to carry out than the conclusion of such a pact? The signing of a non-aggression pact would in no way modify the balance of forces -- as it is the fashion to call it -- between the existing blocs.

Its implementation would consequently present no difficulties. If there were a real desire to solve first and foremost those questions which present the least difficulty, and the solution of which would at the same time do much to lessen international tension and create an atmosphere of confidence, it would be natural to proceed as soon as possible to the conclusion of such a pact. Moreover, such an agreement, based on the renunciation by both parties of recourse to force or threats of force, and upon their undertaking to settle all disputes exclusively by peaceful means, would reinforce the determination of the peoples to live in peace, and their conviction that peace can be safeguarded.

In the present situation the very existence of two military blocs having at their disposal armed forces and armaments without precedent in history creates distrust and maintains the chronic threat of an armed conflict. We must not forget

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the lessons of history. Two world wars which have brought untold suffering were precipitated, if not provoked, by the existence of two great antagonistic blocs in Europe. Within the framework of those blocs, rearmament measures very similar to those which we are now witnessing undermined to a great extent the efforts made to safeguard peace and, more particularly, to conclude an agreement on disarmament.

There can be no doubt that the suppression of the military blocs themselves would be the ideal solution; but meanwhile a non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty would make it possible to thwart all aggressive intentions. It would contribute greatly to the improvement of the international climate, and would act as a deterrent to a would-be aggressor.

Apparently it would also be favourably received by many delegations and many countries, amongst them certain Western delegations. The Italian delegation has stated:

"On the draft non-aggression pact ... in principle we are always in favour of any declaration which affirms that there are no aggressive intentions on either side". (ENDC/PV.110, p.42)

Other Western delegations, among them that of the United Kingdom, have stated that their Governments also favour the conclusion of such a pact. For the United States, President Kennedy stated in his message to the Soviet Premier on 27 October 1962 that he was prepared to examine any useful proposal which might help to reduce international tension, and in particular any proposal concerning relations between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries. Moreover, there cannot be the slightest doubt that the delegations of the non-aligned States participating in our Conference would be in favour of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between those two groups of countries. There should therefore be no obstacle to the conclusion of such a pact.

How are we to explain the intransigence of the United States delegation in refusing to discuss this question? Does the United States believe that, when the time came, it would have difficulty in persuading certain of its allies who are not participants in our Conference to ratify a non-aggression pact? If that is so, we

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should be very interested to know who are these allies of the United States within NATO who would object to the conclusion of such a pact. What is even more incomprehensible is the fact that other Western delegations have given their support to the United States refusal to discuss this question on the basis of an alleged parity rule to the effect that, if a question proposed by one side is accepted for discussion, a question proposed by the other side must also be accepted.

We do not wish to raise objections to certain arrangements adopted in the past by the co-Chairmen; but we should certainly oppose the conversion of these arrangements into fundamental principles of procedure, especially if they became obstacles to the solution of certain problems which are extremely important for our Committee's work. To oppose by inconsistent procedural subterfuges the discussion of a question which is both important and easy to solve, such as the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, amounts to saying that the Western Powers do not wish to facilitate our Conference's work. We do not believe that the Western delegations' refusal to place the question of a non-aggression pact on our agenda and to discuss it can meet with our Committee's approval.

There are important and decisive questions the discussion of which should not be rejected on procedural pretexts. The present discussion on procedure reminds us of another question which the western delegations have refused to discuss in the past, that of general and complete disarmament. This question, which was submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations by the Soviet Union in 1959, was received with distrust, as will be remembered, by the western delegations. In the Ten-Nation Committee which met as a result of a decision of the General Assembly at its fourteenth session, a long discussion was initiated on the Committee's terms of reference. In spite of the clear and explicit terms of the General Assembly resolution (1378 (XIV)), the delegations of the NATO countries in the Ten-Nation Committee succeeded in preventing any progress in the Conference, on the pretext that the task assigned to the Committee was to discuss and to agree, not upon elements of a programme of general and complete disarmament with a view to concluding a treaty, but upon so-called "partial" or "specific" measures.

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The problem of general and complete disarmament is now one which all States consider their own. No one any longer opposes discussion of general and complete disarmament, or negotiations for reaching a solution to this problem. It is no longer a Soviet problem. It is a problem which has become the common property of all nations and even of all governments -- or at least so they say.

We believe that the problem of concluding a non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the Atlantic Treaty is one of those whose solution would influence favourably the further development of our work. Hence it should be included in our agenda and discussed immediately after the collateral problems concerning which the co-Chairmen appear already to have formed an opinion, particularly the Declaration on renunciation of use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75), and measures tending to reduce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation or failure of communications (ENDC/70).

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): In accordance with the recommendation of the co-Chairmen (ENDC/PV.108, p.34) adopted by our Committee, we are scheduled today to resume discussion of matters relating to general and complete disarmament. Ever since resuming our work on 12 February last we have concentrated our efforts on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. We believe that to do so was fully justified because it seemed, at least to us, that accord on that question was very near and that it could be reached if only the Soviet delegation were willing to engage in real and serious negotiations. Unfortunately, we seem to have been unsuccessful so far in convincing the Soviet delegation that it should change its rigid and unreasonable position and begin discussing the major issues involved in reaching agreement on a test ban treaty rather than continue to insist that discussion be limited to the question of numbers alone, and to Soviet numbers at that. We shall continue to make every effort to seek ways and means of reaching agreement on a test ban, and we still hope that the Soviet delegation will begin to do the same.

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At the same time we believe that our Committee is seized of a number of tasks, some of them short-range tasks such as the search for agreement on the test ban and the various collateral measures, and some long-range tasks such as our efforts to develop a rational and equitable method of reaching our ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament. We believe we should not completely neglect any of our tasks. Rather we hold the view that, even though our minds may be preoccupied primarily with the most immediate problem, the test ban, we should devote at least part of our efforts to laying the groundwork for the solution of other important matters before us.

It is for that reason that we sincerely hope that the present procedural disagreement concerning the resumption of the work of the Committee of the Whole will be settled, and settled soon, on a basis acceptable to all. Our position is simple. A pair of measures is proposed -- one by the East and one by the West -- for priority discussion, and priority discussion has been agreed for that pair of measures. Let us get on with the discussion of those items. For our part we hope that we shall be able to consider and reach agreement on measures which would reduce the risk of war, increase international confidence, and thus contribute to the maintenance of world peace.

It is for the same reason that we welcome the opportunity of renewing our discussion of the problems we face in the field of general and complete disarmament, and specifically those relating to stage I of the disarmament process. By virtue of their scope and admitted complexity those problems will require most thorough deliberation and analysis if we want to make progress towards our ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. In that connexion we should like to note that years of patient negotiations -- negotiations filled with hopes and disappointments -- have been required to bring us to the point where we now stand on the nuclear test-ban issue. Having said that, I wish to stress, however, that we sincerely hope that our negotiations in the other areas of disarmament will move faster and with fewer moments of disappointment. Nevertheless, I am sure all of us realize that patience and unceasing effort will be required of us to reach agreement on these very important but difficult issues.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

One such issue, of course, is the problem of reducing armaments in stage I, listed in our agreed procedure of work as items 5(b) and (c) (ENDC/52). It is our view that armaments represent a most important element of a military establishment, and that if we succeed in agreeing on the most rational and equitable way of reducing them, our task of reaching agreement on a complete programme for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world will be greatly facilitated.

The Committee is aware that the United States delegation, as distinct from the Soviet delegation, has always held the view that the questions of nuclear-capable armaments and conventional armaments should be discussed together. The philosophy underlying that approach is very simple. We believe that the only sound way to proceed on the road towards a disarmed world is to start from the world as it is today, from both the political and military standpoints, and to start shrinking the military establishments of nations in a gradual and balanced manner with appropriate verification, while at the same time gradually developing the peace-keeping institutions to safeguard the security of nations in a disarmed world. In other words, what we are proposing is that we freeze at a given moment in time the existing military situation and reduce it progressively to zero, beginning with a 30 per cent across-the-board reduction of all major armaments.

A second and also important reason for that approach is that it is not possible, in our view, to discuss separately nuclear-capable and conventional armaments in the absence of a clear definition of what constitutes each of those two groups of armaments. We have had long discussions of that problem in our Committee, and I do not propose to go into the details again today.

It is the view of the United States that the method of progressive across-the-board reductions of armaments has numerous advantages. It would provide for a continuing and orderly progression of disarmament measures until we reached our ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. That progression would take place through all the stages of the disarmament process, while at the same time providing for a realistic allocation of disarmament measures among the different stages and avoiding the over-burdening of any particular stage.

The method of progressive across-the-board reduction of armaments also facilitates and makes feasible control of disarmament measures, particularly in stage I, when the disarmament organization would be in the initial stage of its operations and when over-extensive control measures would be impracticable -- not to speak of the

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fact that even adequate control measures appear to raise difficulties with the Soviet Union. The verification arrangements for stage I measures proposed by the United States would be adequate to provide a reasonable assurance against possible violations, while at the same time they would not require undue disclosure of information pertaining to national security of States.

The existing political and military situation in the world, whether we like it or not, cannot be expected to change overnight or at the wave of a wand. The method of gradual across-the-board reductions does take that situation into account by not introducing in a short period of time measures which are inconsistent with present political and strategic realities. It should be recognized that the military establishments of various States have evolved in response to each country's own assessment of its own military requirements. The existing pattern of weapons systems, or what is called the armaments mix, varies from nation to nation. Different nations place different reliance on the various types of armaments -- whether they be nuclear-capable or conventional -- in safeguarding their national security. But in each case the mix of the various armaments constitutes an intricate system of highly interrelated and integrated components.

Consequently, we should seek such a method of reduction of armaments as would not involve the problems of changing significantly the pattern of the existing mix of armaments during the disarmament process, while at the same time providing for significant reductions in each of the disarmament stages. We believe that the United States proposal for a 30 per cent across-the-board reduction of armaments in stage I meets this requirement. This method of reduction would avoid the problem of imbalances which would tend to arise should we attempt to negotiate reduction arrangements disturbing the basic pattern of ingredients in the existing armaments mixes. It would also greatly simplify our task here as compared to a situation where we should in effect be obliged to negotiate a new composition of the forces of the various States.

The members of the Committee will recall that on 10 December 1962 my delegation tabled a draft treaty article (ENDC/69) dealing with reductions of armaments. I should like to recall briefly the most important features of that draft article.

Consistently with the United States basic approach of gradual across-the-board reduction of armaments, our proposal provides for reduction by specified parties in stage I of 30 per cent of all of their major armaments, including nuclear-weapon

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delivery vehicles, existing at an agreed date and listed in an appropriate declaration which would be submitted to the disarmament organization. The reduction would take place in three steps, each lasting one year. Each step would be divided into two parts. During the first part armaments to be reduced within that step would be deposited with the international disarmament organization, while during the second part the deposited armaments would be destroyed or converted to peaceful use.

The reductions would be subject to agreed arrangements for verification by the international disarmament organization, including arrangements to assure the parties that the agreed levels of retained armaments were not exceeded. In that connexion I should like to repeat that under our proposals we did not include in the very first stage of disarmament such measures as would require over-extensive verification arrangements. Our proposals provide for reduction in stage I of only major armaments, so as not to overburden the disarmament organization at the outset of its operation. On the other hand, I can affirm our previously-expressed readiness to consider inclusion of all types of armaments in stage I reductions if the Soviet Union should insist upon such inclusion, and if it is prepared to spell out and to accept the necessary additional amount of verification.

The United States proposal also provides for measures imposing strict limitations on the production and testing of armaments, so as to prevent States from compensating for the armaments reduced by producing new and perhaps even more advanced weapons during the disarmament process. Under the United States proposal the parties would be prevented from exceeding, through new production, the levels of armaments reached as a result of the 30 per cent reduction of each type of armament existing at the beginning of stage I. Furthermore, limitations would be imposed on parties in connexion with the production of parts and assemblies which could be used in any type of armaments subject to reduction.

The parties would also be prohibited, after stage I had been initiated, from expanding their production facilities related to the armaments subject to reduction and from constructing or equipping new facilities for the production of any type of armament which they had not produced before the beginning of stage I. The United States proposals contain also the important provision providing for prohibition

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of the testing or production of new types of armaments, as well as for a limitation of flight testing of missiles. Of course, all of the measures I have just enumerated would be subject to agreed arrangements for verification by the international disarmament organization.

My delegation firmly believes that the United States proposal for a progressive, across-the-board reduction of armaments, beginning with a 30 per cent across-the-board cut in all major armaments in stage I, represents a sound, realistic and equitable approach towards reducing the armaments of nations until, at the end of stage III, the military establishments of States have been brought to the levels required only for the maintenance of internal order and security and for providing agreed contributions for the international peace force.

I do not intend to dwell in great detail today on the approach advanced by the Soviet Union, particularly since the Soviet position on at least a part of the whole problem of reduction of armaments seems to have been subjected to a modification the precise nature of which has not yet been made clear to us. I refer, of course, to the proposal introduced by Foreign Minister Gromyko at the General Assembly last fall (A/PV.1127, p.38-40), and mentioned today by the representative of Bulgaria, that a certain number of delivery vehicles of specified types be retained until the end of stage II, as distinct from the earlier Soviet proposal that all nuclear delivery vehicles be eliminated in stage I. I shall return to Mr. Gromyko's proposal later.

At this point, however, I should like to note that, at least as far as the general class of conventional armaments is concerned, the Soviet Union, after accepting the 30 per cent reduction approach in stage I last summer, seems to be in agreement with the United States. At the time of the acceptance by the Soviet Union of that approach we welcomed the Soviet move, and expressed the hope that the Soviet Union would draw the logical conclusion from it and extend the principle of a 30 per cent reduction in stage I to all classes of major armaments. That hope was furthered last fall by Mr. Gromyko's proposal to which I have just referred. Indeed, we thought at that time that the Soviet Union had come to realize how untenable had been its position which provided for a total elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles in stage I.

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Representatives will recall that, after our recess last fall, my delegation sought from the Soviet delegation clarification and elaboration of Mr. Gromyko's proposal so that we could have a clear understanding of what the Soviet Union had in mind. In a sincere effort to examine the amendment to the Soviet position regarding nuclear delivery vehicles, my delegation raised certain points relating to the various aspects of the new Soviet proposal and asked the Soviet delegation for clarification and elaboration of those matters. Unfortunately, neither in our Committee meetings nor in private meetings of the co-Chairmen has the Soviet Union so far agreed to provide us with the necessary clarification and elaboration. Rather, it has insisted on the West accepting the Soviet proposal in principle before any discussion on the substance of that proposal could be initiated.

It may be useful to recall to the Committee the broad areas in which my delegation asked for clarification and elaboration of the Soviet proposal. First, we asked for clarification on how far and in what respects the Soviet proposal departed from the 30 per cent across-the-board approach, which the United States considers to be the most realistic and suitable method of armaments reductions. We pointed out that the Soviet Union now proposed a reduction in strategic delivery vehicles which appeared to be something more than 30 per cent and something less than 100 per cent, and we asked what it was. My delegation also stated that, if the Soviet proposal implied a cut in United States intercontinental strategic vehicles, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles and long-range bombers, by a percentage greater than for the Soviet Union, that increased the complexity of the problem; and we asked for clarification on the extent and justification of any such proposed disparity.

Secondly, we asked for clarification and elaboration, at least in terms of some general indications, of the ranges of numbers and of categories of armaments the Soviet Union had in mind under its proposal. We noted that what the Soviet Union was proposing was that some armaments should be reduced by 30 per cent, some by 100 per cent, and some by a percentage or amount in between; and we stressed the need to know which was which.

Thirdly, we asked for an indication of the Soviet attitude on the problem of verification in the light of its new proposal. For, in the past, the Soviet Union had asserted that total elimination would be easy to verify; it had claimed that the

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existence of one nuclear delivery vehicle would be a clear proof of violation. But the new Soviet proposal is based on a different approach which provides for the retention of a precise, agreed level of the most destructive form of armaments. We asked, therefore, whether the Soviet Union still maintained its position which, as we understood it, excluded verification of retained levels.

Several months have elapsed since my delegation asked the Soviet delegation to provide us with clarification and elaboration of these major areas of the new Soviet proposal for the retention of certain nuclear weapon delivery vehicles until the end of stage II. The Soviet delegation has now had, we believe, ample time to study the points raised not only by the United States delegation but also by other members of our Committee. We sincerely hope that the Soviet Union is now in a position to provide us with such information about its proposal as would enable all of us to understand clearly the meaning of what it is proposing. For our part, we are looking forward to a serious and meaningful discussion of this most important problem of the reduction of armaments, the solution of which would greatly expedite our work on developing a balanced first stage of a programme for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

Mr. HASSAN (United Arab Republic). The Government of the United Arab Republic has expressed its grave concern and has made protests each time a nuclear Power has conducted a new nuclear weapon test, no matter when or where that test may have been conducted. It was with a sense of genuine shock and grave alarm that the United Arab Republic delegation learned about the latest French nuclear test in the Algerian Sahara, through the Algerian Government's official communique which gave information of the French test and described it as an attempt against Algerian independence and sovereignty.

My delegation wishes, therefore, to protest against the latest French test in the Sahara and to express its deep regret that the French Government should have found it possible to range itself against the expressed sentiments and interests of humanity, against repeated explicit United Nations resolutions asking France to desist from conducting any tests on the African continent, and finally against the very recent appeals and forewarnings of the Algerian and other African Governments specifically not to conduct the latest test.

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

Nuclear tests in general are an evil and a crime against present and future generations. The findings of reliable international scientific bodies leave no room for any other description of the effects of nuclear tests. But whereas other nuclear Powers try to appropriate and to contain this evil by conducting their tests on their own territories, or in the far reaches of the wide oceans as a second best, today, once again, we regretfully find that nuclear test hazards and ill effects are being imposed on the African continent and its peoples by an outside, non-African Power. Whereas the African States and peoples are not parties to the nuclear armaments race, the armaments race is being imposed upon them by a foreign nuclear Power at a time when that Power knows full well the explicit desires and sentiments of the African peoples.

At a time when the Eighteen-Nation Conference is exerting its efforts to arrive at a test-ban settlement, at a time when the differences have narrowed tremendously and agreement on the cessation of all tests looks more likely than ever, any new atomic tests at this juncture are in direct opposition to our objectives and a challenge to our efforts. I submit that the civilized world should not let this challenge to its moral authority go without an adequate reaction on its part. For it will always remain like this: the latest nuclear test has given rise to the newest, and the newest may give rise to yet another newer test. As we see it, neither the one nor the other has any justification in fact or in morality.

We at this Conference, and especially the great nuclear Powers, have a lesson to draw from this latest unfortunate test. The best example that the great nuclear Powers can give to France, and possibly to any other nuclear aspirants, is for them to begin by desisting from any further tests and to sign a nuclear test ban treaty with no further delay. Only in that way can this Conference aim, with any degree of justification and hope, at stopping this evil game once and for all and before it becomes too late.

As I already have the floor, I should like to say a few words about the work of the Committee of the Whole. A good deal of time and effort has been devoted by the Conference during the last few meetings to a discussion of the agenda of the Committee of the Whole. It would seem to us that, to use a recently popular expression, we are trying to break through an unlocked door. The matter should be much simpler than that. An easy way out, and also a fair and impartial one, has been used by this Conference

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before. In one single meeting each of the two co-Chairmen should review the items favoured by his own delegation for inclusion in the agenda on collateral measures, and should give his reasons. He should also list his own proposed items and the order of his preference for their priority. Then we could adopt one of two possible approaches:

(a) Item 1 on each of the Soviet and the United States lists could be paired off and given parallel discussion at one and the same meeting, or alternate discussion at alternating meetings. The same course could be adopted with item 2 on each list, then with item 3 and so forth. That is, at each echelon two items could be paired off as they became, in the opinion of the co-Chairmen, equally ripe and ready for discussion;

(b) alternatively, if the co-Chairmen agreed, the two lists could be merged in one joint co-Chairmen's list, an item from the Soviet list alternating with an item from the United States list, aiming at a joint list of an equal number of items drawn from the two original lists.

Either of the above methods of procedure should solve the problem of the deadlock, preserve the necessary balance, and guarantee to each co-Chairman the right of airing and discussing the items of his choice. We hope, therefore, that the two co-Chairmen will without further delay agree on an agenda which will satisfy the rights of both their delegations.

Mr. KURKA (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): On behalf of my delegation I should like today to make a few remarks on certain aspects of the future work of the Committee. But before doing so I should like to associate myself with the protest voiced today by the representative of the United Arab Republic against the resumption by France of nuclear tests in Africa. It is very much to be regretted that, at a time when we in this Committee are seeking a way to achieve an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests, the Sahara is resounding with the thunder of nuclear explosions carried out, in spite of the protests of the peoples of Africa and of all the world, by one of the Western Powers and a member of this Committee.

There is no need to stress the danger of the actions of the French Government, which is not only boycotting our efforts in the Eighteen-Nation Committee but is also

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ignoring the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations of 1 January 1963 on the cessation of nuclear tests (ENDC/63). My delegation cannot fail to add its voice to the voices of those who express their indignation and protest against such actions, which are contrary to the cause of peace and to our efforts in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

And now, Mr. Chairman, permit me to pass on to some of my remarks in regard to the future work of our Committee. In our opinion, the discussion of this question in plenary meetings will be very useful because it will enable the two co-Chairmen to acquaint themselves with the views of all the members of the Committee before working out their recommendations on the question of a programme of work. In our opinion this is an urgent question, the solution of which ought not to be delayed any longer.

After all, more than five weeks have already passed since we assembled here in Geneva in order to resume the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. If we draw up a tentative balance-sheet of the work of the Committee for that period, we get a rather dismal picture. No progress has been made in the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The competence of the Committee to prepare recommendations for concrete measures aimed at reducing international tension has not yet been utilized. The negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests, for which all the peoples of the world have been so greatly hoping, have bogged down as a result of the position taken by the Western nuclear Powers on the question of the number of on-site inspections.

However, the development of events outside this Committee room does not stop. The feverish nuclear armaments race is threatening, like an avalanche, to sweep away the foundations on which the peace and security of the world of today are based. The senseless armaments race is depriving humanity of the fruits of its labours. The policy of strength which is being advocated by certain influential circles in the West is being placed above the fundamental obligations of States laid down by the generally-recognized standards of international law.

In this situation there is no more urgent task than, through the united efforts of all States in the spirit of the United Nations Charter, to achieve an agreement on measures which would halt this dangerous trend and block the path to war for ever.

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That is why we welcomed the recommendation of the two co-Chairmen of 12 March that, as a general rule, the plenary meeting on Mondays should be devoted to a discussion of the test ban, and the two other meetings --- that is, on Wednesday and Friday --- should be allotted to discussion of general and complete disarmament, beginning with items 5(b) and (c) of document ENDC/52. (ENDC/PV.108, p.34).

In my opinion it is important that, in preparing their recommendation, the co-Chairmen on the one hand took into consideration the wish of the majority of the members of this Committee that negotiations on the test ban should continue, and on the other hand indicated the need to take up again the discussion of disarmament problems. After all, our principal and ultimate aim is to achieve, in an atmosphere of confidence and co-operation, an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

We consider that at this stage of our negotiations we must not lose sight of this basic aim. General Assembly resolution 1767 (XVII) calls upon the Eighteen-Nation Committee to resume its negotiations on general and complete disarmament expeditiously and "in a spirit of constructive compromise". But this resolution at the same time

"Recommends that urgent attention should be given ... to various collateral measures intended to decrease tension and to facilitate general and complete disarmament". (ENDC/64).

Bearing this resolution of the General Assembly in mind, we cannot leave unnoticed that part of the communication of our co-Chairmen which states that no agreement was reached on an agenda for the Committee of the Whole. This fact is all the more surprising since, during the general debate at the beginning of the resumed negotiations, most of the members clearly expressed their views on the list of items which the Committee should consider.

What is preventing a speedy agreement from being achieved on this question? The explanation offered us by the two co-Chairmen, and the course of the discussion on procedure, show that the main reason for the absence of agreement is to be found in the opposition of the United States to the discussion of certain extremely urgent political problems. We cannot, of course, agree with the views expressed here that in drawing up an agenda we must keep to some completely unwarranted plan. In our

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view, in determining the list of questions relating to specific measures we must be guided by the degree of urgency of any particular measure. From this point of view, priority should be given to the problem of the withdrawal of the strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons from bases located on foreign territory, and the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the Warsaw Treaty States and NATO. Both measures are aimed at eliminating the main causes of tension in the existing specific conditions characterized by the nuclear armaments race.

We believe that the main criterion for the inclusion of any particular item in the agenda of the Committee of the Whole must be an assessment of the extent to which its successful discussion might contribute to lessening the danger of war and improving the international atmosphere. First among such questions is the draft Declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75), which was submitted by the Soviet delegation at our ninety-seventh meeting. The urgency of this question is stressed by the fact that military bases with strategic means of delivery on the territory of foreign States are one of the most serious sources of international tension, and create a constant possibility of the outbreak of a military conflict between the nuclear Powers.

In our opinion, all this points to the need to discuss the Soviet draft Declaration in earnest. We think that sufficient evidence has been adduced in our negotiations to show that in this case there is no question of any propaganda aimed at diverting the attention of the Committee to less important questions so as to prevent the discussion of more important ones. For this reason we were pleased to note that agreement had been reached between the two co-Chairmen to include this item in the agenda of the Committee of the Whole.

Now I should like to make a few remarks on the non-aggression pact, the inclusion of which in the agenda is obviously the main obstacle which has prevented agreement between the co-Chairmen. I will say quite frankly that we are astonished by the attitude taken by the representatives of the United States and its allies in regard to this question.

It is hardly possible to doubt the extreme importance and urgency of concluding a non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the

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States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. One can hardly dispute the significance for international peace and security of the conclusion of an agreement which would confirm the obligation of States to refrain from attack and from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations and in international relations in general, and to settle all disputes by peaceful means only, and on the basis of mutual consultations whenever there is a threat to peace and security.

There are serious arguments in favour of the signature of such a treaty. Indeed, the fate of peace depends to a considerable extent on how the relations between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries develop -- that is, between the States possessing the main military forces and all the nuclear potential. A non-aggression treaty would contribute to the normalization and development of relations between countries with different social systems. We are convinced that acceptance of such a treaty would in no way entail any kind of unilateral advantage for one side or the other. Undoubtedly the only gainer would be the world.

The representative of Bulgaria has this morning already called the attention of the Committee (supra, p. 8) to the message sent by President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev expressing the willingness of the United States to consider any Soviet proposal aimed at lessening tension between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries. The delegations of the Western Powers now have before them a draft pact (ENDC/77) the provisions of which are clearly aimed at reducing the danger of the outbreak of a world conflict, and at creating favourable conditions for the discussion of a number of other questions to be settled by our Conference, including especially the question of general and complete disarmament. The urgency and usefulness of such a pact has been mentioned also by the representatives of the non-aligned States in their speeches during the debate.

Therefore, and I repeat this now, we are amazed at the position of the United States delegation, which from the very outset of the negotiations has taken a prejudiced attitude towards this draft. It seems to us that an attempt is being made here to use an old method: if you cannot put forward any objection to the substance of the matter, start delaying the negotiations with procedural matters. The objection to the discussion of this draft, which we heard, for example, from the United States representative, Mr. Foster,

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to the effect that the draft non-aggression pact should not be discussed in the Eighteen-Nation Committee because, as he alleged, it does not concern disarmament (ENDC/PV.100, p.50), contradicts a number of statements made by the United States representatives themselves, who have repeatedly acknowledged that the task of this Committee is to discuss not only questions of disarmament but also measures creating favourable conditions for disarmament.

At our last meeting the representative of Italy, in connexion with the problem of a non-aggression pact, argued that we are not here to draw up declarations or repeat commitments already solemnly undertaken when we became members of the United Nations (ENDC/PV.110, p.42). This argument against the idea of concluding a non-aggression pact between the Warsaw Treaty countries and the NATO countries cannot be regarded as new or as politically or legally appropriate. The United Nations Charter(Article 2,paragraph 4) categorically requires all Member States to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. The conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the Warsaw Treaty countries and the NATO countries would not simply be a mere repetition of what has already been assumed by the Member States of the United Nations as a legal obligation; although even the repetition itself of an assumed obligation to refrain from aggression would not, in the present world situation, be altogether useless. In the first place, the conclusion of such a pact would extend the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force in international relations to those States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the Warsaw Treaty which are not Members of the United Nations.

The conclusion of such a pact would be fully in keeping with Article 2,paragraph 6, of the United Nations Charter, according to which

"The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these United Nations Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security."

There is no doubt that the most appropriate way of doing this would be to exert an influence on non-member States by offering them the opportunity of undertaking legal

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obligations analogous to those assumed by the other States in consequence of their acceptance of the United Nations Charter. In addition, the urgent need for the conclusion of such a pact derives from the fact that the existence of military groupings whose members have at their disposal weapons of unimaginable destructive power gives special significance to the consistent application of the fundamental obligation laid down in the Charter to the specific circumstances of the present-day situation. The reaffirmation and development of the obligation to refrain from non-aggression laid down in the United Nations Charter would be bound to contribute to observance of the Charter and to the maintenance of peace and international security.

We maintain the view that the draft non-aggression pact between the countries of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO should be discussed as soon as possible. That is why we are putting forward the demand that a decision be taken immediately to include this item in the agenda of the Committee of the Whole immediately after the Soviet draft Declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75) and after the United States item on reduction of the risk of war through accident, miscalculation or failure of communications (ENDC/70).

In conclusion, I should like to express the hope that the two co-Chairmen will take into consideration the remarks made by the participants in our Conference and try to work out as soon as possible recommendations on the agenda for the Committee of the Whole befitting the urgency and timeliness of the various questions.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

First of all I should like to say a few words on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. The United States representative began his statement this morning by pointing out that, in regard to the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, the United States delegation would go on trying to obtain further concessions from the Soviet Union especially in respect of the inspection quota, and that it would continue its attempts to draw the Committee into technical discussions while refusing to reach agreement on the main issues. By acting in this way the United States is trying to cover up and disguise the real cause

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of the deadlock in our negotiations, which is that the United States is preventing the achievement of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests on the basis of two to three inspections a year and the installation of three automatic seismic stations on the territory of the United States and of the Soviet Union.

The opposition of the United States to an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests is of course no mere accident. This position of the United States is in fact an inevitable result of the policy of the nuclear arms race which the United States and its NATO allies are persistently carrying out with ever-increasing intensity. The recent feverish measures aimed at equipping Western Germany with nuclear weapons, and the contemptuous, outrageous attitude of the United States and its NATO ally France towards the appeal of the General Assembly for the cessation of nuclear weapons tests after 1 January 1963 (ENDC/63), form the background against which our negotiations are taking place in Geneva.

The Soviet delegation fully associates itself with the protests expressed in this Committee by the delegations of Nigeria, the United Arab Republic and Czechoslovakia. It is significant that none of the delegations of the Western Powers, including the delegation of the United States, has uttered a single word of condemnation of France. Mutual support prevails. This silence of the representatives of the Western Powers clearly shows that France, by conducting nuclear explosions, is contributing to the common cause of the Western bloc by intensifying the nuclear arms race. These actions of the Western Powers of course make the negotiations in Geneva much more difficult. They undoubtedly reflect the policy of the Western Powers which is preventing the achievement of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, and is preventing any progress in the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Today the Eighteen-Nation Committee is starting -- or rather resuming -- discussion of the problem of general and complete disarmament. The drafting of a disarmament treaty has been and still remains the Committee's main task, assigned to it by the General Assembly when it was set up. The General Assembly at its last session, after considering the problem of disarmament, reaffirmed in its resolution 1767 (XVII) of

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21 November 1962 the need for an urgent solution to this fundamental problem of our time. It called on the Eighteen-Nation Committee "to resume at Geneva its negotiations on general and complete disarmament ... until agreement has been reached" (ENDC/64).

The disturbing trend of events in the world today has confirmed the rightness of this recommendation. Everyone remembers the events of last autumn in connexion with the Caribbean crisis, when the aggressive actions of the United States and its military allies brought mankind to the brink of world war. The peoples expected that States would learn the appropriate lessons from these events and would take advantage of the favourable conditions created by the peaceful initiative of the Soviet Government which prevented a military conflict. We must note, however, that, instead of doing so, the Western Powers have taken the course of still further intensifying the nuclear arms race, and have taken steps leading to a further aggravation of the international situation.

The United Kingdom-United States Nassau agreement regarding nuclear submarines equipped with Polaris missiles carrying nuclear warheads, the intensive intrigues over plans to create a multilateral NATO nuclear force which would lead to equipping the West German Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons, the acceleration of the conventional armaments race under the aggressive slogan of a "non-nuclear sword" on a world-wide scale, the conclusion of a military agreement between France and Western Germany, and attempts to impose nuclear bombs on Canada, are links in the chain of feverish military preparations which have recently been undertaken by the Western Powers on the United States initiative and under United States pressure. All this cannot fail to spread anxiety and tension in the world. In this connexion I should like to draw attention to the words of the representative of Mexico, Mr. Padilla Nervo, who said on 12 February:

"Hostile events are increasing, and new crises can lead us once again to the brink of war.

"The world views with alarm the rate of growth of both thermo-nuclear and conventional armaments, which is being increased with the declared purpose of creating deterrents capable of preventing a nuclear holocaust." (ENDC/FV.96, p.6)

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There is one sure means which will eliminate decisively and for ever the danger of war which threatens humanity. It is general and complete disarmament. There is no alternative. Every day, with each new turn in the world political situation, life itself shows ever more clearly and convincingly that this problem -- disarmament -- must be solved without delay.

The Soviet Government is doing everything to ensure progress in solving the problem of general and complete disarmament, and to get the negotiations moving again. On the very first day of these negotiations, on 14 March 1962, the Soviet Government submitted for the consideration of the Committee a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control (ENDC/2), the implementation of which would make it possible in a very short time to rid mankind of armaments and wars. We did not rest content with that, and during further negotiations, in order to bring the positions of the sides closer together and to start moving forward at last, the Soviet Union introduced into its draft a number of amendments and clarifications taking into account the position of our partners in the negotiations (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and orr.1). I shall recall them.

First, the Soviet Government agreed that, when nuclear weapon delivery vehicles are destroyed in stage I, an exception should be made for a strictly-limited and agreed number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the "ground-to-air" category in the possession respectively of the Soviet Union and of the United States alone.

Secondly, the Soviet Union accepted a compromise solution to the question of the level of armed forces of the Soviet Union and of the United States in stage I, and agreed that the level should be 1,900,000 men for each of these Powers.

Thirdly, the Soviet Union accepted the United States proposal on the procedure for the reduction of conventional armaments. As a result of this, there is now agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union that in the first stage of general and complete disarmament tanks, armoured vehicles, armoured troop transports, non-nuclear artillery systems and other types of conventional armaments should be reduced by 30%.

Fourthly, the Soviet Union agreed that the period for the implementation of general and complete disarmament should be increased from four to five years.

Fifthly, the Soviet Union agreed to accept some of the measures proposed by the United States for the first stage, such as the exchange of military missions between States and the establishment of swift and reliable communication between the Heads of governments and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

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In regard to the proposal of the United States concerning advance notification of major military movements and manoeuvres within the national territory of States, the Soviet Union, considering this measure by itself to be insufficient to achieve its aim, proposed supplementing it with the prohibition, starting with the first stage, of all major joint military movements and manoeuvres involving the participation of the armed forces of two or more States. Obviously measures of that kind would acquire definite significance only if carried out within the framework of general and complete disarmament. Taken by themselves, in isolation from disarmament measures, they would not only be useless but, what is more, they could be turned against the security interests of particular States.

Taking into account the views put forward by the representatives of a number of non-aligned States, the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to transfer from stage II to stage I measures for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons, provided the other side agreed. But we can hardly expect such a display of good will and foresight from the Western Powers.

Recent events have once again confirmed the correctness of the Soviet Government's approach to the problem of general and complete disarmament. They have very clearly shown the imperative need to solve this problem without delay by concentrating attention on its main elements. The draft treaty on general and complete disarmament proposed by the Soviet Union is intended to fulfil this purpose. It not only ensures transition within the shortest possible time-limits to a world without armaments and wars, but it also enables disarmament to be started with concrete radical measures which will immediately eliminate the threat of nuclear war. This brooks no delay. Herein is the key approach to the solution of the problem of disarmament. It would set us going in the right direction from the very start and with the proper speed.

Having entered upon this path, we must follow it unswervingly and consistently right to the end and not stop halfway. Otherwise, what sense would there be in starting general and complete disarmament if at some moment the process could be halted at the will of one side and the armaments race resumed, so that mankind would be thrown back to its original situation — the present conditions of a reckless armaments race and military preparations? The advantage of the Soviet

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plan is that it provides a solution to the problem of disarmament from start to finish, leaving no one any possibility of halting the disarmament process halfway. After its implementation, there can be no return to the past with its perpetual fear of war breaking out.

On the other hand, if we examine from the same angle the United States Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World (ENDC/30) the picture will be different. The United States proposals do not meet the requirements of the present international situation. The measures in the United States outline are so arranged that the threat of a nuclear-missile war would not only remain throughout the whole disarmament process but would in fact be retained for ever. Under the United States plan, nuclear weapons are not subject to total destruction, even after the completion of disarmament. They would only nominally change their owners: they would pass out of the hands of national armed forces into the hands of some international armed force. We say nothing of the fact that the United States plan is hedged with such conditions that disarmament could be stopped at any moment and the peoples would be no better off than at the start.

These shortcomings of the United States plan make it especially vulnerable and unsatisfactory against the background of the events which took place last autumn. These shortcomings should now be obvious to the authors of the plan themselves, and one would think that they ought to draw the appropriate conclusions from recent events so as to enable us to achieve an agreement which would solve the main problem of the present time: immediate elimination of the threat of a nuclear-missile war.

In resuming discussion of general and complete disarmament, we consider that the best thing to do at this stage would be to concentrate the discussion on the main measures for stage I, the adoption of which would enable us immediately to come to the very essence of the task set before us and, as the saying goes, to take the bull by the horns.

The Soviet Union is decisively in favour of radical measures being undertaken during the first stage of disarmament which would make it possible to eliminate from the very beginning of disarmament the danger of an outbreak of war with the use

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of atomic and hydrogen weapons. For this reason we are prepared in the first stage of disarmament to prohibit nuclear weapons, to cease their production, and to destroy all stocks of these weapons of mass destruction. However, the Western Powers -- and the United States in the first place -- will not agree to this. But if, owing to the unwillingness of the Western Powers, it is not possible to eliminate nuclear weapons at the very beginning of disarmament, then why not try to select a different way -- the way, so to speak, of neutralizing the dangerous properties of these weapons and precluding any possibility of their use?

Guided by these considerations, the Soviet Union has proposed that measures to eliminate the threat of nuclear war should be divided into two stages: in the first stage all nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles would be eliminated, from super-powerful missiles down to special artillery installations; and in the second stage the nuclear weapons themselves would be destroyed and prohibited. This would in fact eliminate the nuclear threat in the very first stage of disarmament. Deprived of their vehicles, the nuclear weapons would be confined to their depots and await their final elimination in the second stage of disarmament.

At the same time, of course, all foreign military bases on alien territory must be dismantled. It is at these bases that the main means for atomic attack are located, and they are the advanced strongholds of aggression. It is well known that the Soviet Union's main means of defence are powerful global and long-range missiles. In proposing to destroy all nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage of disarmament, the Soviet Union is consequently prepared to destroy its principal means of defence at the very beginning of the disarmament process. It should be clear to everyone that, in taking this step, the Soviet Union not only may but also must insist that at the same time foreign military bases on alien territory should also be liquidated and foreign troops withdrawn from such territory. Otherwise the security of the Soviet State would be seriously affected.

Unfortunately, owing to the position taken by the United States and other Western Powers during the previous work of the Committee, we failed to reach agreement on the earliest possible destruction of nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles.

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Moreover, the Western Powers tried to hide behind obviously flimsy arguments: for instance, that the destruction of all atomic and hydrogen weapon vehicles in the first stage, together with the liquidation of military bases on foreign territory, would result in upsetting the strategic balance in the world in favour of the Soviet Union, would place the European countries forming part of NATO at a disadvantage, and would deprive the United States of the possibility of ensuring the speedy defence of these countries. It was also said that the Soviet proposal was pointless because some party to the treaty might conceal delivery vehicles and subsequently use them for its own military or political purposes.

The artificiality of these arguments is obvious. The Soviet delegation has in the past produced facts and figures to show their groundlessness. The arguments put forward by the Western Powers to justify their refusal to agree to the elimination of all nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage are neither well-founded nor convincing.

However, we must remember that the opposition of the Western Powers to this proposal of the Soviet Union is blocking the achievement of agreement. Although we consider groundless the objections of the Western Powers to the Soviet proposal to eliminate all nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage of disarmament, nevertheless, since we are guided by the desire to facilitate the achievement of agreement, we are prepared to try to arrive at a compromise solution of the problem. It was for this purpose that the Soviet Government submitted at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly a new proposal which provided for the retention by the Soviet Union and the United States, until the end of the second stage of disarmament, of a strictly limited and agreed number of inter-continental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the "ground-to-air" category (ENDC/2/Rev.1; A/PV.1127, p.38-40). The necessary amendments were accordingly introduced into the Soviet draft treaty.

Thus certain means of defence would be retained for a definite period in case, as the Western Powers have expressed the fear, someone should decide to violate the treaty or conceal missiles or military aircraft. We do not believe that after the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament anyone would take the risk of concealing any delivery vehicles. But we want to help the Western Powers to rid themselves of these unfounded and unjustified fears.

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During the preceding session of the Eighteen Nation Committee, in November and December 1962, we gave the necessary explanations of this Soviet proposal and replied to the various questions which were put to us about it. The main thing now is, without wasting time, to achieve agreement on our proposal to liquidate in the first stage of disarmament all delivery vehicles, except a strictly-limited number to be retained by the Soviet Union and the United States until the end of the second stage. There is now every possibility of doing so.

In this connexion I should like to draw the attention of the Committee once more to the new version of article 5 of the Soviet draft treaty, where the gist of the approach proposed by the Soviet Union is set out in clear treaty language. We have been asked, for instance, what types of missile we propose should be retained by the Soviet Union and the United States — the two main representatives of the opposed military groupings. Article 5 of the Soviet draft treaty enumerates the types of missile which the Soviet Union and the United States would be able to retain until the end of the second stage of disarmament.

These, in the first place, would be inter-continental ballistic missiles, the retention of which should provide those additional guarantees of security on the need for which the representatives of the Western Powers have had so much to say. They would be a deterrent which would invalidate any attempt to retain missiles of aggression secretly in violation of the treaty. Any State which might venture to embark upon aggression would realize perfectly well that sure retribution would follow.

Secondly, there would be anti-missile missiles. The retention of these missiles is also intended to meet the views which have frequently been expressed here by the Western representatives. After all, if someone were to conceal a number of missiles, as the Western Powers fear, the other side would be able to safeguard its security through retention of the means of destroying these missiles in the air.

Thirdly, the Soviet Union proposes that anti-aircraft missiles in the "ground-to-air" category should be retained in case, as the Western Powers fear, someone should try to conceal military aircraft in violation of the treaty, or to adapt existing civil aircraft for purposes of aggression.

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The Soviet Government's proposal that the Soviet Union and the United States should retain a certain number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the "ground-to-air" category does away with the doubts and objections expressed by the Western Powers against the Soviet proposal to eliminate nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage of disarmament. The parties are given additional guarantees of their security, since they have everything necessary to protect their territory against attack by anyone who might venture to violate the treaty. Therefore, the new Soviet proposal fully complies with the statements of the Governments of the Western Powers that they link their acceptance of disarmament with the necessity of additional guarantees for the security of States in the disarmament process.

Incidentally, I should like to point out also that the Soviet proposal for retention of an agreed number of missiles enables us to facilitate considerably the solution of the problem of control over general and complete disarmament. In putting forward demands for control over remaining armaments or the establishment of so-called zonal inspection, the Western Powers have repeatedly asserted that such inspection is required in order to prevent the clandestine retention of the most dangerous types of armaments which, they allege, might upset the existing balance of forces. We have previously pointed out that such assertions are groundless. And now they have finally lost all meaning. The retention by the Soviet Union and the United States of inter-continental missiles, which would deter any aggressor who might contemplate violating the treaty, as well as the retention of anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles capable of protecting the security of States in the event of such a violation, would make any concealment of armaments pointless.

We propose that a certain number of missiles, which have already been mentioned, should be retained until the end of the second stage of disarmament. This time-limit has not been chosen at random. By that time nuclear weapons will have been eliminated, and consequently the danger of nuclear attack will have become for ever a thing of the past. States will have neither nuclear weapons nor their means of delivery; in other words, the reasons and arguments with which the Western Powers justify their insistence on additional guarantees of security will no longer hold.

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It can hardly be asserted seriously that after the completion of the second stage of disarmament a State will be able to conceal missiles or nuclear warheads. It suffices to study the relevant provisions in the Soviet draft treaty to realize the complete absurdity of such suppositions. International inspectors will verify without any hindrance the elimination of missiles, military aircraft, ships, submarines and other types of armaments which could be used for delivering nuclear weapons. They will verify that the plants previously producing such armaments have either ceased to exist or have been switched to peaceful production. Thus international inspectors will verify the destruction of all nuclear weapons and the cessation of their production. By that time they will have verified the destruction of 65 per cent of conventional armaments and the corresponding reduction in the production of conventional armaments and war supplies.

One has only to visualize all this gigantic control machinery in action to come to the inevitable conclusion that the scope of the control measures after the completion of the second stage of disarmament will be so great that any possibility of concealing anything from the eyes of the international inspectors will be completely eliminated.

It may, of course, be said that after the completion of the second stage of disarmament States will still retain a certain number of armed forces. But how many will there be? Under the Soviet proposals their number for the Soviet Union and for the United States should not exceed one million men, and for other States so much the less. Moreover, these armed forces themselves will undergo fundamental changes. For their equipment there will no longer be nuclear weapons, missiles, bombers or other types of modern technical means capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction to their targets.

The Soviet delegation has already given in the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament the necessary explanations of the nature of our proposal for the retention by the Soviet Union and the United States of an agreed number of missiles until the end of the second stage of disarmament. Thus the Western Powers can take without delay a decision in principle on this question.

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We have repeatedly heard from the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom that they are prepared to help to overcome the obstacles standing in the way of disarmament. Six months have already passed since the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. Gromyko, submitted this Soviet proposal at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, but so far there has been no clear and unequivocal answer from the United States on whether it is prepared to support this proposal.

The Soviet Union has gone a long way towards meeting the Western Powers. Now it is up to them. Their acceptance of the Soviet proposal for the retention by the Soviet Union and the United States of an agreed number of missiles until the end of the second stage would clear the way to specific negotiations and would open up greater possibilities for agreeing on the main measures for the first stage of disarmament.

We hope that the Eighteen-Nation Committee will make every effort to come as soon as possible to an agreement on the elimination of all nuclear weapon missiles in the first stage of disarmament, except for a strictly limited and agreed number of missiles to be retained by the Soviet Union and the United States until the end of the second stage. This is the key to the solution of the main problem of today — the elimination of the threat of a nuclear catastrophe.

We shall make our comments on the questions touched upon by the representative of the United States in his statement this morning after we have studied Mr. Stelle's statement in the verbatim record.

Mr. IMRU (Ethiopia): I should like to associate myself with the speakers this morning who have shown their solidarity with the Government of Algeria in its protest against the atomic test explosion which has just taken place within its territory. It is with both sorrow and indignation that my delegation has received the news of the explosion which has been undertaken by a foreign Power on the territory of the independent and sovereign State of Algeria against the expressed will of the Government of the Republic of Algeria. The rights of the Algerian people and State have been infringed. African soil has once again, as has happened so many times in the past, been poisoned and polluted; the strongly-held views of

(Mr. Imru, Ethiopia)

Africans and their governments, as expressed in the various resolutions at the meetings of the independent African States on the denuclearization of their territories, have been flouted; the United Nations resolutions have been spurned, and the friendship of Africans has been unduly alienated. All this has been done by the Government of France, which has already boycotted this Conference which is promoting peace and disarmament.

We live in the latter half of the twentieth century, in an age when Africans are masters of their destiny, in an age in which distance has lost the sharpness of its dividing edge and in which various peoples of the world co-operate in the many creative fields of human endeavour. Our people have a great admiration for the contributions of the French people, and our two countries have had occasion to co-operate fruitfully in the past. We find it necessary, however, to protest at an act which threatens the peace, health and well-being of a sister African country and flouts the expressed will of the African people.

We express the hope that the Government of France will play its rightful role at this Conference and bring its contributions to bear in the consolidation of peaceful and fruitful relations among nations, instead of undermining the peace and independence of African countries.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland) (translation from French): The Polish delegation wishes to associate itself with those delegations which have registered a protest against the underground nuclear test just carried out by France in the Sahara. This act is a flagrant violation of Algerian sovereignty, and a defiance flung in the face of all the peoples. It is contrary to the express will of the African peoples; who are opposed to their continent becoming a testing-ground for nuclear weapons or an atomic base for other Powers. It is contrary to the desire almost unanimously expressed at the last General Assembly of the United Nations that all nuclear weapon tests should cease from 1 January 1963. The French underground explosion in the Sahara is also a violation of the Declaration on colonial independence voted by the General Assembly of the United Nations (A/RES/1514 (XV)). It is an act of neo-colonialism which cannot fail to arouse the indignation of the whole world.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

However, in this field French policy falls within the framework of the general policy of the Western Powers. It is just one more link in a chain of events which can only accelerate the armaments race and favour the spread of nuclear weapons, to the great satisfaction of the West German militarists whose principal objective is to place atomic weapons at the service of their policy of revenge.

The French explosion in the Sahara is a portent and a warning. It testifies that the adversaries of disarmament are themselves not disarming; and this imposes upon us the solemn duty of redoubling our efforts to reach as soon as possible an agreement on a nuclear test ban on the basis of the latest Soviet proposals.

The CHAIRMAN (India): Since no other representative wishes to speak at this time, I should like to make a few brief remarks on behalf of the delegation of India.

Our delegation deeply deplores the recent nuclear test in the Sahara. Our Prime Minister has frequently stated the opposition of India to all nuclear tests, wherever they might be conducted; and in this case there is also the consideration that a test has been conducted on the territory of a State which has not in the least welcomed the event, and on a continent which has raised its voice clearly in favour of denuclearization. We therefore regret this test all the more, and trust that the unequivocal demands of world opinion will be heeded, at least to the extent of ensuring that there shall be no repetition of this kind of event in the Sahara — or indeed elsewhere.

We have listened with special interest today to the very apposite suggestions of the representative of the United Arab Republic for removal of the procedural obstacle to substantive discussion of measures that could be considered in the Committee of the Whole (*supra*, p.18). We would urge the co-Chairmen to take those suggestions into account and to resolve the issue, so that we may proceed to substantive work in the Committee of the Whole.

We are glad that today has also witnessed the reopening of discussion on general and complete disarmament. We must all, surely, be sobered by the fact that, after a year of work on disarmament, we have reached no agreement in this field, and that that is a record of negative activity which all of us must sincerely want to transform.

(The Chairman, India)

Our delegation believes that it will be the endeavour of all members of the Committee to avoid discussion purely of positions, and that there will be a genuine search for common ground -- firm ground, which we could test and find capable of accommodating in a satisfactory manner the various concerns that exist and that must realistically be taken into account.

Those are the remarks I wanted to make in my capacity as representative of India. Other representatives are now being stimulated to speak, and I call upon the representative of Canada.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): Several delegations have mentioned the underground test recently carried out in the Sahara by France. I would say that the position of the Canadian Government has been against all and any testing of nuclear weapons anywhere. That is well known, and I think it should scarcely be necessary for me to repeat it here. However, it does seem to me that Monday's event should serve to remind us all that, if there is no agreement between the great nuclear Powers here to stop nuclear testing, it is inevitable that first one country and then another, and then many others, will decide to become nuclear Powers and will carry out their own tests.

When I listened to the representative of the Soviet Union describing what was going to happen at the end of the second stage of general and complete disarmament (supra, p.34) I must say that that seemed to be looking through a very powerful telescope very far into the distance, if we consider what very slow progress we are making with this problem which lies immediately before us and which all of us want to see solved here.

Since nuclear testing has been mentioned — and I think nearly every representative who has spoken has mentioned it — I should like to make a few remarks arising out of things that were said at two of our recent meetings.

At our meeting on 18 March the representative of Bulgaria quoted (ENDC/PV.110, p.10) from an article by Walter Lippmann in the New York Herald-Tribune of 13 March. That same passage had previously been quoted by the representative of the Soviet Union (ENDC/PV.108, p.27). Mr. Tarabanov read only a small portion of the article, and appeared not to have appreciated its whole trend. I should not like to say that he merely quoted the small section of the article that supported the viewpoint he was arguing; but in order to restore the balance I should like to read into the record the following additional sections of Mr. Lippmann's very pertinent article:

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

"... The supreme question is whether the USA and the USSR can agree not to do any more testing in the hope of changing the existing balance of power in nuclear weapons."

After a few sentences, he went on:

"The hope of achieving an absolute superiority exists among some scientists and some military men in both countries. It does not exist by any means among all scientists or all military men".

After a few more sentences he continued:

"Such hopes of absolute superiority, which neither side will avow publicly, explain why the public surface argument against the proposed treaty is what it is -- the Americans talking about cheating and the Russians talking about espionage.

"The truth is that the Russians do not really mean that two or three on-site inspections are all right while seven or eight would be espionage which would undermine the security of the Soviet Union. What the Russians mean is that, if they offered fewer inspections than Mr. Kennedy thinks he can accept and still get the treaty ratified, they will have proved that they want to stop testing and they will still be able to test."

Then Mr. Lippmann goes on to point out that there are certain influential Americans who are opposing testing, and he comes to the conclusion:

"... we should have a full debate on whether, for the sake of peace and of our own national interests, it is better to slow down nuclear development by banning tests or to stimulate development by continuing the tests."

"This is the real question both in this country and in the Soviet Union. Our fears of cheating and their fear of espionage are cover arguments used by men who in their hearts believe that they must find a way to continue to test without outraging world opinion. Four more on-site inspections than the Soviet Union has already offered will not reveal much of anything which this country does not already know about the Soviet military establishment. But those few extra inspections might enable the President to get a treaty ratified, and that is precisely what those who want to go on testing in the Soviet Union do

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

not want to see. Nor is there any serious dispute that with our present improved methods of detection, including a few on-site inspections, the chances of perfectly safe and undetectable cheating on a profitable scale are close to zero."

I hope that every representative at this Conference has read the article in its entirety and, as our colleagues from the Soviet Union are fond of saying, "will draw the necessary conclusions". The article was brought forward by the representatives of Bulgaria and the Soviet Union, and I think we should look at it as a whole rather than simply take one sentence out of it as was done in their quotations.

The representative of Bulgaria had also some objections to the very general and approximate mathematical formulae which I put before the Committee (ENDC/PV.108, pp.22 et seq) to illustrate the relation of various factors in the problem of negotiating a test ban treaty. The reason why I did that was, as I explained at the time, to show that the number of inspections required was dependent on the other factors in the problem, such as the composition of teams, the area to be inspected, and so forth. Mr. Tarabanov says (ENDC/PV.110, p.13) that each delegation might have its preference in the definition of parameters and that we should be involved in a technical discussion. That is perhaps so, but somehow or other those preferences must be discussed and compromises must be reached if we are to have a test ban treaty.

In the next paragraph Mr. Tarabanov says:

"However, the important point now... is... to hasten to reach an agreement on the Soviet compromise proposals concerning on-site inspections and automatic seismic stations. All the other questions and parameters can easily be settled afterwards..." (ibid.)

Mr. Tarabanov, while recognizing that those questions have to be settled, could not explain, and the representative of the Soviet Union has not explained, why, if all other questions could be settled so easily after the question of numbers is decided, they could not be equally easily settled before it is decided. The Western position, of course, is that the "numbers" question should be discussed at the same time as those other matters -- or in parallel, to put it another way. If the Soviet Union's positions are so reasonable, and it is so sure that they are conformable to the positions of the Western nuclear Powers, it would surely make for progress to let us know what those positions of the Soviet Union

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

are. If the positions of the two sides on every other condition of the on-site inspections are agreed, then surely it would be simple to reach agreement on the number condition, bearing in mind the general proposition stated by Mr. Lippmann, which I have quoted -- and I think he has not said anything in this respect which has not been in the minds of many representatives around this table.

It is the hope of the Canadian delegation that the Soviet representative will before long receive instructions which will allow him to discuss the problem as a whole. In this connexion I should like to quote, as others have done, the very cogent remark of the representative of Nigeria: "It is logical that the parties to any treaty should know what the treaty is all about." (ENDC/PV.110, p.30) Mr. Tsarapkin said in reply to that, in effect, that, after the United States had agreed unconditionally to the Soviet Union's stipulation on the number of on-site inspections and the number of automatic seismic-detection stations, then and only then could it learn what the treaty was all about. I can imagine what Mr. Tsarapkin would reply if the situation were reversed and the Soviet Union were faced with a similar pre-condition to negotiation.

In conclusion, my delegation expresses the hope that before long we shall be able to take a step in the direction of agreement on the matter which is of first concern to all of us here, as I think has been many times emphasized in our statements.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French). We are very happy to note that, as a sequel to our remark upon the article in the New York Herald-Tribune concerning the influential circles in the United States which exert a pressure upon that country's Government and which direct very important interests, that article has been quoted almost in full. I am sure that the members of the Conference have read it, but it was also useful that a Western delegation should provide us with the entire text, so that we can gain a clearer idea of it.

We are sure that the attitude taken by this distinguished American journalist towards the United States is based on a full knowledge of the facts. He knows well what is happening in the United States. He knows the influence that these circles can exert upon the Government and upon United States policy as a whole. It cannot be doubted that he is qualified to make an entirely correct appraisal of what is happening there. But

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

someone who defends the United States Government's policy -- and in general Mr. Walter Lippmann does defend it -- cannot reproach another government for not yielding to that Government.

Of course we shall re-read the Canadian representative's remarks concerning the formula which he submitted to the Committee and the different parameters which it involves, by means of which the Canadian delegation and the other Western delegations wished to involve us in a discussion of questions of detail and technical questions relating to the problem of nuclear tests. But we should particularly like to thank the Canadian delegation today for giving us, through its statement, the opportunity of associating ourselves with its protest against the nuclear tests undertaken by the French Government in the Sahara. There can be no doubt that this is a sign that the time has come to put an end to nuclear tests. These tests clearly show that we must do what is required as soon as possible to obtain a nuclear test ban treaty.

While I have the floor, I should like to say a few words about what has incited, and above all what has encouraged, the French Government to continue its nuclear tests. It will be remembered that, at the General Assembly of the United Nations, the United States Government and the United States delegation strenuously opposed the cessation of nuclear tests in all environments from 1 January 1963. The United States delegation opposed this item in the resolution which was voted by the General Assembly. Moreover, the United States Government has continued to undertake nuclear tests; this has opened up great possibilities for other States and has certainly encouraged the French Government to continue its policy of re-arming and the development of its own nuclear force. That is why we think that the United States in particular should stop playing with fire and with nuclear tests, and should do what is necessary to secure here in the Conference an agreement with the Soviet Union on this point.

At the same time we should like to congratulate the Algerian Republic and the Algerian people on their brave struggle against nuclear tests on their territory, and against the treaties which oblige them to tolerate interference with their sovereignty, and which make it possible to carry out nuclear tests on their territory.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and eleventh plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Lall, representative of India.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Bulgaria, the United States, the United Arab Republic, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, Ethiopia, Poland, India and Canada.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 22 March 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.